India-Sri Lanka Relations : An Analysis of the Changing IOR Dynamics

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SHIVANGI KANAUJIA (ASSISTANT EDITOR)

The 2020 National Maritime Day, observed on April 5, 2020, marked the unprecedented spread of the Coronavirus in India and the World. With the Pandemic came the suspicions over China’s foreign policy engagements, and how no international sector – maritime, economic, diplomatic or Technological – is saved from its clutches. In this light, it becomes necessary for us to spectate on China’s ulterior geopolitical motives, especially in the Maritime domain. This article will assess the emerging dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), China’s role in the region, and will discuss an important regional partnership – that of India and Sri Lanka.

The Indian Ocean Region, being the only ocean named after a state, has over time proved its geopolitical importance, especially for India in terms of shaping its relations with other key players in the region, and in this tapestry, Sri Lanka has a significant role to play. Robert Kaplan, a famous author on foreign affairs, points out that Sri Lanka serves as the main line of communications between the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea and between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Having said that, the recent maiden overseas visit of Sri Lankan President Gotabhaya Rajapaksha to New Delhi and his talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi is now being anticipated as the revival stroke amidst otherwise shaky bilateral ties between both the countries since the past decade.

Relations between India and Sri Lanka suffered a major setback during the last decade because of the three major reasons – the Tamil National Question after the conclusion of Tamil Separatist Insurgency in May 2009, international accountability for alleged Eelam War crimes and finally, the shifting dynamics in Indian Ocean Region among India, Sri Lanka and China. Realists like the University of Chicago’s John J. Mearsheimer and other geopolitical thinkers are of the opinion that China’s rise lies with its geographical advantage and Sri Lanka being its “Ace” in the Indian Ocean Region. While on the other hand, Sri Lanka falling prey to China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” and its involvement in China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative have forced India and its allies to take adequate diplomatic steps without further ado.

China is offering hundreds of billions of dollars in infrastructure financing to Sri Lanka for developing various projects including the development of Hambantota Port which further culminated into China’s Merchant Ports Holdings Ltd. lease for a period of 99 years. Not only does the port’s location at the southern extremity of Sri Lanka, overlooking South Asia’s vital sea lanes make it an important commercial asset for China but it also has strategic dimensions in terms of Security and Peacekeeping in the Indian Ocean Region. 

The Hambantota Port : A Case Study in China’s Debt-trap Diplomacy | Source : Ship Technology

However, amidst these changes taking place, India still carries her tag of an extremely important player in geopolitical matters and New Delhi can still become the focus of diplomatic initiatives. Prime Minister Modi’s ‘Act East Policy’ has been extended from the ‘Look East Policy’ to accommodate the regional and cultural integration and  ‘neighbourhood first’  policy which has become central to his Foreign Policy since 2014. Further, his promotion of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) maritime initiative for developing a ‘blue-economy’ in IOR countries is an instrumental step in eliminating the ‘China-factor’ and moving towards trust-building between both the countries.

Further, the sense of priority, extended by PM Modi’s promising steps to develop alternative inter-regional connectivity and commercial networks such as Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), seems to have brought about many new hopes in this matter. Having mentioned that, it should not be forgotten that many such initiatives have also been taken up in the past but the process of converting them into reality has always been a matter of concern, especially on India’s part.

Post Rajapaksha’s return, the Sri Lankan Government has been contemplating about the two sides ‘wanting’ to declare the Indian Ocean as a ‘peace zone’. This can be seen as the starting point for future negotiations on China-centric security debates. India also needs to attribute the appropriate seriousness to this idea of ‘peace zone’ as it deserves and see if it could draw Sri Lanka out of China’s embrace based on mutual trust. Also, beyond whatever steps Sri Lanka takes, India should not solely focus on building a case against China, rather it should take efforts to show what it really stands for. Further, Sri Lankan politics will be affected from time to time by the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean due to its close proximity to India and the maritime route. Thus, balancing New Delhi, Washington, and Beijing will be a priority for Sri Lankan foreign policy. Amidst such circumstances, it can be expected that “Sri Lanka could potentially take a  lead role in establishing a  movement that demilitarises and de-securitizes the  Indian  Ocean by building a regime for peaceful cooperation”, as has been rightly pointed out by Professor Indra de Soysa (INSSSL  Defence  Review  2017).

REFERENCES :

  1. Abeyagoonasekera, Asanga (2016). Researchgate [Online]. Available at : https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332277427_Geopolitics_of_the_Indian_Ocean_and_Indo-Sri_Lanka_Relationship
  2. Abeyagoonasekera, Asanga (2018). The Diplomat [Online]. Available at : https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/sri-lanka-the-indian-ocean-and-the-new-era-of-great-power-competition/
  3. Singh, Abhijeet (2018). ORF [Online]. Available at : https://www.presidentsoffice.gov.lk/index.php/2019/06/10/modis-sagar-concept-and-sl/?lang=en
  4. Silva, Harsha de (2017). Ministry of External Affairs, Sri Lanka [Online]. Available at : https://www.mfa.gov.lk/depfm-isas/

The Views expressed in this article are personal to the author(s). They do not, in any way, express the views of Youth Forum or its members.

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