The Relevance of QUAD from an Indian Perspective

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Dwaipayan Sinha
Jadavpur University

On March 12, 2021, for the first time, the leaders of the four significant democracies, Australia, India, Japan and the United States, met via a virtual summit, signalling a substantial change in the world order. Will try and throw light on the relevance of Quad from an Indian perspective and also on the Quad Summit objectives. As rightly pointed out by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the principal themes of the conference were coronavirus vaccines, climate change, and emerging technologies.

The leaders highlighted the growing need for cooperation among the members to deal with the global COVID-19 pandemic with a joint vaccine partnership. Moreover, leaders also reiterated the call for a comprehensive, free and open Indo-Pacific. This development must be viewed in light of the recent declassification of a document titled “US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific” by the former Trump administration. 

The report, produced by the National Security Council in 2018, explicitly states that the US’ objective is to maintain its primacy in the region. Washington envisions doing that by defending the homeland and ensuring that the US firms continue to be the top players in the world economy. The United States views China as the primary challenger to its global hegemony. Thus, the entire US policy in Asia is focused on containing the growth of China.

A Brief History of the QUAD

The evolution of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue(QUAD) grouping can be traced back to 2004 when India, Japan, Australia and the United States came together to form an ad hoc Tsunami Core Group. The group’s primary goal was to create a combined humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) capabilities for the member states. Other group plans included promoting democracy, rule-based order, an accessible and inclusive Indo-Pacific, as mentioned by the leaders in a joint statement following the summit.

The attempts at the creation of Quad quickly fell through due to several international events. In May 2007, the former heads of the governments met separately on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum summit in the Philippines, making the group official. In his visit to India in August 2007, Japan’s then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe highlighted the necessity of the formation of the QUAD to counter the might of China in the region. 

Baby steps were taken towards consolidating the new alliance with a joint naval exercise (Exercise Malabar) alongside discussions at various international platforms. The efforts to create a coalition in the Indo-Pacific region came to a halt when Abe, the key driver of the coalition, resigned in September 2007. 

Under former PM Manmohan Singh’s administration, India was pressured by the communist allies as they were not happy with India’s joint naval exercise with the United States. Dr Singh also had to grapple with the protests against the Indo-US nuclear deal, a significant and sensitive issue to both countries.

India, who desired a Nuclear Suppliers’ Group waiver, was wary of alienating China by joining an openly anti-China alliance.

The revival of the QUAD in recent times can be primarily attributed to Barack Obama’s “pivot” to Asia and Donald Trump’s trade war against Beijing. The group resurged in 2017 after lying dormant for a decade. 

Several ministerial-level discussions were held on how the Quad can counter the expansionist policies of China in South Asia, the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The aggressive Chinese moves in places like Ladakh, Taiwan and Hong Kong have not gone unnoticed. Beijing’s bullying nature over territorial and maritime disputes have broken the illusion that it would be a “considerate power”, as envisaged by the former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating. Australia now fears the increasingly growing influence of China on their politics. 

The recent border clashes, the impact of One Belt One Road and China –Pakistan Economic Corridor in Indo-Pacific and the blockage of India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group membership has made New Delhi anxious. New Delhi views the Indian Ocean Region as an area of its own influence and would not like to see China become the dominant force. Japan, which has a territorial dispute with China, has not taken the targeting of Japanese companies by China kindly. 

Successive US governments have realised the dangers China presents in the 21st Century. The US government has even gone to the extent of accusing China of economic espionage.

The US-China relations worsened under Trump Administration. The Quad has thus brought about an alliance among like-minded partners primarily based on an anti-China agenda. 

The trilateral India-US-Japan two-day joint Malabar naval exercise in 2020 saw Australia rejoining the group. The current Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison called the previous walking out of Australia from the Quad a “mistake”. India and Australia signed a pact that would allow them to use each other’s military bases. The Quad grouping would also endeavour in sharing military intelligence, logistics and skills.   

How Does India Fit In

India faces twin challenges in the Indo-Pacific from the Chinese dragon. China has used its “string of pearls” policy to encircle India in the Indian Ocean region. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitious CPEC project has also compromised India’s territorial sovereignty and Actual Control (LAC). India had been following a very cautious line since the Wuhan summit to avoid getting into the bad books of China. There appears to be a significant change in dealing with China following the clashes in Galwan valley between the Indian and Chinese soldiers in June 2020.

The border skirmishes led to the death of 20 Indian soldiers. The Indian establishment has realised the necessity of a military alliance with countries sharing similar concerns following the border clashes in 2020. The continued Chinese backing to its all-time ally Pakistan posits several questions to India’s foreign policy experts. 

The United States views India as the alternative power centre to China in Asia and thus wants to accelerate the growth of India. It sees India as an important military ally and hopes to integrate India into US arms manufacturers and the US-led war projects worldwide.

Washington has pledged to sell more military hardware and share military intelligence with New Delhi. The United States has also expressed its desire to encourage the Indian establishment to engage beyond the Indian Ocean region. Critics, however, believe that the US plans to use India as a subordinate ally in furthering its own foreign policy goals.

With the expansion of the Malabar exercise, previously an Indo-US affair, to other Quad members like Australia and Japan, the alliance has made it clear that it is serious in its efforts to contain China. Containing China’s economic might, however, would be a daunting task as the members have deep economic relations with China and do not agree on the measures they can use. 

To counter China’s vaccine diplomacy, the Quad has decided on a Covid vaccine initiative where India will manufacture the Johnson &Johnson single-shot vaccine using funds from the US, Japan and Australia. The alliance plans to provide one billion vaccines for the Southeast Asian countries, where China has significant influence. The United States hopes to undercut China’s economic and political ties in the region by this initiative.

Being an active member of the Quad has some repercussions for India. The participation in a military block to restrain China contradicts India’s long-standing policy of non-alignment. India’s interest in Central Asia might also be undermined due to an alliance with the United States. 

Various political analysts believe that there is a China-Pakistan-Russia alliance in the making to counter the Quad alliance in the Indian Ocean region. Russia is India’s key defence partner, and New Delhi would be cautious of antagonising Kremlin. Political observers believe India is getting closer to the United States as there has been a significant shift in how India deals with China. 

New Delhi’s call for an ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ and banning of 59 Chinese apps following the Galwan clashes shows that India is not willing to give a free run to Beijing’s transgressions. China does not view the Quad grouping and its initiatives favourably. China has labelled the grouping as an “exclusive clique’ and expressed its dissatisfaction over the group. Chinese officials have stated that individual member states must resolve the differences with China instead of ganging up against it.

India knows that it has to deal with the emergence of an assertive China. Thus, it has to build bridges with China, its immediate neighbour and most significant trade partner, even as it counters the hawkish foreign policy of the latter.